Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment and to backpay?

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. 

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)

Does pardon extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime?

■ A conditional pardon, when granted, does not extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime. (People vs. Nacional, G.R. Nos. 111294-95, September 7, 1995)

■ Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists otwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)

Is the question on the exercise of executive clemency by the president a political question?

While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the President. Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been conferred an "expanded jurisdiction" to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (Llamas vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991)

May the President grant executive clemency in administrative cases?

"Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos." If the law does not distinguish, so We must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from punishment therefor. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to them. (Llamas vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991)

Is conviction of a crime by final judgment necessary before a pardonee can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence?

■ Where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefor by final judgment, in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. (In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Torres, G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995) 


■ 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process (due process is not necessarily judicial), and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. (Torres vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987)

May pardon be granted during the pendency of an appeal?

Pardon can be granted only after conviction by final judgment. (People vs. Salle, G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995)

The conviction by final judgment limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement. (People of the Philippines vs. Bacang, G.R. No. 116512, July 30, 1996)

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?

Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. 

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him. While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)

Pardon vs. Amnesty

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (People vs. Casido, G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997)

AMNESTY	PARDON
Addressed to political offenses	Infractions against the peace of the state
Classes of persons	Individuals
No need for distinct acts of acceptance	Acceptance necessary
Requires concurrence of Congress	Does not require Congressional concurrence
A public act of which the courts may take judicial notice	Private act which must be pleaded and provided
Looks backward and puts into oblivion the offense itself	Looks forward and relieves the pardonee of the consequences of the offense