Can the Supreme Court create a Special Division of the Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide the plunder case against former Pres. Estrada?

Under Sec. 5, par. [5], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights and procedure in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly, given the nature of the Plunder Case and cases related thereto, the prominence of the principal accused and the importance of the immediate resolution of the cases to the Filipino people and the Philippine Government, this Court, in the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases, with due regard to the procedural and substantive rights of the accused, deems it best to create a Special Division of the Sandiganbayan to be composed of members mentioned in the immediately preceeding paragraph. This Special Division shall hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder Case and all related cases filed or which may hereafter be filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and those accused with him, until they are resolved, decided and terminated.

The designation of temporary alternate members may be properly addressed later. Meanwhile, until otherwise revoked, the Acting Presiding Justice is authorized to designate from time to time, an alternate member to be drawn from the remaining members of the Sandiganbayan as the exigencies of the service may require. (In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division, A.M. No. 02-1-07-SC, January 21, 2002)

Can the Congress amend the Rules of Court?

But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999)

Are the members of the Judiciary exempt from income taxes?

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably. (Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 284)

May the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases be appealed to the Supreme Court?

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. (Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742.  September 16, 1998)

In Fabian, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman. (Villavert vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715. February 23, 2000)

What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction?

The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 is clear on this issue. It provides:

Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases As far as practicable, the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision.

Given the clarity of the rule that does not distinguish, we hold that the three (3) month period, not the twelve (12) month period, to decide cases applies to the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan presently sitting in five (5) divisions, functions as a trial court. The term trial is used in its broad sense, meaning, it allows introduction of evidence by the parties in the cases before it. The Sandiganbayan, in original cases within its jurisdiction, conducts trials, has the discretion to weigh the evidence of the parties, admit the evidence it regards as credible and reject that which they consider perjurious or fabricated. (In Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC, November 08, 2001)

Is Congress prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year? How about the Judiciary?

With respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly provides:

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5 merely states:

Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year. (Civil Service Commission vs. DBM, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005)