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Showing posts with label Presidential Immunity from Suit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Presidential Immunity from Suit. Show all posts

What is the concept of presidential immunity from suit?


It simply means that "incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure." (In re: Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180, 24 October 1986)

It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbency. (Lozada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012)

What is the rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit?


The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988)

Does executive immunity mean that the President, while in office, cannot sue others? Who may claim immunity?


■ No. The immunity of the President from suit is personal to the President. It may be invoked by the President only and not by any other person.

■ In the case of Beltran vs. Makasiar, Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

The Court held that this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988)

Does executive immunity continue even after the president leaves office? What is the scope of the immunity?


■ No. Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.

■ After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties.

■In the case of Estrada vs. Desierto, it was held: "The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. It declared as a state policy that (t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." It ordained that (p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. It set the rule that (t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency." (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 02, 2001)

■ In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of the original Petition and the issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for the court a quo to have dropped her as a respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit.

It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, former President Arroyo can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a defense to evade judicial determination of her responsibility or accountability for the alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.

Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still results in the denial of the Petition on the issue of former President Arroyos alleged responsibility or accountability. A thorough examination of the allegations postulated and the evidence adduced by petitioners reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain Ma'am, whom Lozada speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that the President was hurting from all the media frenzy, there is nothing in the records that would sufficiently establish the link of former President Arroyo to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that Lozada and his family purportedly received. (Lozada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012)

May a department secretary who is an alter ego of the President invoke the President’s immunity from suit?


■Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President, he cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely those of a department Secretary. 

■ Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. [Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000].