A judge promulgated her decision within 3 months of the submission of the case for decision. However, only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation and it took a year and 8 months more before the complete decision was furnished the complaint. Did the judge violate any constitutional provision?

The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution which provides:

All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower courts.

Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of the submission of the case for decision, the fact is that only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of her decision, containing her findings and discussion of complainants liability, had already been prepared although it had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight months more before this was done and a copy of the complete decision furnished the complainant on December 16, 1994. Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

1. Judgment defined. - The term judgment as used in this Rule means the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the accused.

2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Since this was done only on December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision was served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision within three months as required by Art. VIII, 15 of the Constitution.

If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see why it took respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was able to do so. Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out her decision by a series of personal and other problems which leads the Court to believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had not finished the preparation of the entire decision. At all events, she could have applied for extension of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of judgment until she had finished it.

What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a sin perjuicio judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment. That is why, in answer to complainants charge that the dispositive portion of the judgment read to him did not impose a fine, respondent contends that the addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within her power to do even if no such fine had been included in the oral sentence given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge states, because the decision was not complete it could be modified and cites in support of her contention the case of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia. Respondent only succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated on April 22, 1993 was a sin perjuicio judgment which was incomplete and needed a statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment was based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of rendering sin perjuicio judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed because of the implied reservation that it is subject to modification when the decision is finally rendered. This Court has expressed approval of the practice of some judges of withholding the dispositive portion from their opinions until the very last moment of promulgation of their judgment in order to prevent leakage, but that refers to the preparation of their decision, not its promulgation. What must be promulgated must be the complete decision. There would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of promulgation of judgment. (Dizon v. Judge Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338, September 5, 1997)

Can a judge be allowed to blame her court personnel for the delay in resolving cases?

The failure of a judge to decide a case within the prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. The failure of her officer-in-charge to bring the matter to her attention cannot be considered a valid reason for the delay in resolving the instant petition. A judge cannot be allowed to blame her court personnel for her own incompetence or negligence. A judge ought to know the cases submitted to her for decision or resolution and is expected to keep her own record of cases so that she may act on them promptly. It is incumbent upon her to devise an efficient recording and filing system in her court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management is as much her responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her official functions. (Ricolcol v. Judge Camarista, A.M. MTJ-98-1161, August 17, 1999)

Does delay in the transcription of stenographic notes or additional assignments or designations excuses the failure of a judge to render decisions within the mandate periods?

The Court has consistently emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the mandated periods. The failure of a judge to render a decision within such time constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires that a judge dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. It amounts to gross inefficiency and warrants administrative sanction.

That the transcript of stenographic notes in cases already deemed submitted for decision has not yet been completed does not excuse such failure. This Court has directed judges to take down notes of salient portions of the hearing and proceed in the preparation of decisions without waiting for the transcribed stenographic notes. The argument that such notes are not official would not relieve judges of their duty to render a decision within the required periods. The solution is not to await the transcription of the stenographic notes but for the judge to pay careful attention to the proceedings and take accurate notes.

Finally, the additional assignments or designations imposed upon respondent Judge does not make him less liable for the delay. Respondent Judge should have known that if his caseload prevented the disposition of cases within the reglementary period, all he had to do was to ask from this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. The Court, cognizant of the caseload of judges and mindful of the difficulty encountered by them in the seasonable disposition of cases, would almost always grant the request. (Gonzales-Decano v. Judge Siapno, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1279, March 1, 2001)

May a judge be held liable for failure to decide a case within the reglementary period?

The failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period constitutes gross dereliction of duty. The gravity of this offense depends on several factors, including the number of cases not decided on time, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, and the presence of other aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In the present administrative matter, only one case was not decided within the reglementary period. Furthermore, respondent judge herself admits her fault, and complainant alleged no undue damage caused by the delay. Under the circumstances, we agree with the OCA that respondent should be fined in the amount of P3,000. (Bernardo v. Judge Fabros, A.M. No. MTJ- 99-1189, May 12, 1999)