Who may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President?

Rule 14 of the PET Rules provides:

Rule 14. Election Protest. Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest. (Poe vs. Arroyo PET Case No. 0002, March 29, 2005)

Would the death of the protestant or the protestee be a ground for the dismissal of the contest or ousts the court of its jurisdiction to decide the election contest?

● While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. (Poe vs. Arroyo PET Case No. 0002, March 29, 2005)

● It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upon death. Thus, applying the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona, upon the death of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue holding his office in his place.

But while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with paramount public interests.  As we have held in the case of Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias:

x x x. It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift, is a proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al., G.R. L-17512, December 29, 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958). So inextricably intertwined are the interests of the contestants and those of the public that there can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in office of the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him of the character of an adversary in the contest inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the office and maintain therein his successor, but also does not in any manner impair or detract from the jurisdiction of the court to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion. (De Castro vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 125249. February 7, 1997)

● Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public interest, wherefore, public policy demands that an election contest, duly commenced, be not abated by the death of the contestant. (Lomugdang vs. Javier, G.R. No. L-27535, September 30, 1967)

May the widow substitute or intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case?

The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and Lomugdang v. Javier, the court permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant's widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest. (Poe vs. Arroyo PET Case No. 0002, March 29, 2005)

Santiago filed an election protest after she lost in the 1992 presidential election. In 1995 election, she was elected senator. Was her assumption to the office as such effectively abandoned or withdrawn her election protest?

Yes. In assuming the office of Senator, the protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her election protests, thereby making it moot.

The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest.

Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since she has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so. (Santiago vs. Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001. February 13, 1996)

Would acceptance of temporary employment a ground for the dismissal of an election protest?

As to the contention that by accepting such appointment as Technical Assistant, protestant has abandoned his protest, all that need be said is that once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands that the true winner be known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties, so much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of facts in this kind of cases. In the same manner that the acceptance by the protestee of an appointment to another position is not a ground for dismissal of the protest like the resignation of the protestee from the contested office, simply because it is of public interest that the real winner be known, neither can the acceptance of a more or less temporary employment, such as that of a technical assistant of the Vice-Governor, which is a primarily confidential position, be considered as inconsistent with protestant's determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. In such instances, the plight of protestant may be viewed in the same light as that of an employee who has been illegally dismissed and who, to find means to support himself and family while he prosecutes his case for reinstatement, accepts a temporary employment elsewhere. Such employee is not deemed to have abandoned the position he seeks to recover. Of course, the case of protestant who accepts a permanent appointment to a regular office could be different, but We are not ruling on it here. (Moraleja vs. Relova, G.R. No. L-30828, October 22, 1971)

Should an election protest be dismissed on the ground of estoppel because the protestant congratulated the protestee after the latter was proclaimed the winner and even exhorted those present during the inauguration and installation into office of the protestee to support the latter's administration?

No. Estoppel rests on this rule: "Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it. 2 The elements of estoppel by conduct are: (1) that there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts; (2) that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the faculty (3) that the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and (4) that it must have been made with intention that the other party would act upon it. 

In the case now before Us, it cannot be said that Ginete had by his acts and declarations made representations of fact regarding De Castro's election which were not known to the latter. Ginete simply made a formal recognition of the fact that De Castro had been proclaimed winner by the municipal board of canvassers of Bulan, and congratulated him — and this Ginete did only after the board of canvassers had proclaimed De Castro winner. It can not be said that De Castro came to know about his having won the election because Ginete told him so. Ginete did not mislead De Castro to the belief that he had won the election. It can not be said that De Castro was led to act — in assuming the office as mayor — because Ginete had made representation to him that he (De Castro) had won the election. De Castro assumed office as mayor by operation of law, because he was proclaimed elected by the municipal board of canvassers in accordance with law. Ginete, by his acts and/or utterances, had not induced De Castro to believe that his election was unquestionable. Ginete is not the one called upon to declare the election of De Castro valid, and so De Castro can not claim that he was induced to believe that he was elected and he assumed office as mayor simply on the basis of Ginete's act and utterances. Ginete never made any statement that he would not question the election of De Castro. The election case, or the election protest, that Ginete brought against De Castro did not arise out of any act or declaration of Ginete. The election case that Ginete brought against De Castro has for its basis circumstances that had taken place during the election held on November 14, 1967, or long before Ginete had recognized the proclamation of De Castro as winner. If De Castro was not the real winner in the elections it would not help his case in the election protest to assert that Ginete had congratulated him after he was proclaimed winner by the board of canvassers. We do not see in the facts and/or circumstances shown by the evidence in this case the elements of estoppel that would bar Ginete from questioning the election of De Castro.The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. What is sought in an election protest is the correction of the canvass of the votes, which is the basis of the proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest involves a public office in which the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing candidate of recognizing the one who is proclaimed the winner should not bar the losing candidate from questioning the validity of the election of the winner in the manner provided by law.

The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. What is sought in an election protest is the correction of the canvass of the votes, which is the basis of the proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest involves a public office in which the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing candidate of recognized the one who is proclaimed the winner should not bar the losing candidate from questioning the validity of the election of the winner in the manner provided by law.

The only case where this Court has held that a party is estopped to Court the election of the winning candidate is in the case of a tie where the candidates who were declared to have obtained equal number of votes had voluntarily submitted themselves to the drawing of lots to determine the winner, as provided by law. It was ruled by this Court that the candidate who lost in the drawing of lots is estopped from contesting the election of the one who won in the draw, because by submitting himself to the draw the defeated candidate is considered to have admitted that the announcement made by the board of canvassers regarding the tie was the result of a valid and lawful canvass. The candidate who submitted himself to the draw is considered as having deliberately induced his opponent to believe that that canvass which resulted in a tie was legal and he had thereby led his opponent to act upon such belief in the validity of the canvass and the tie so that he can not be permitted to repudiate his own acts.

This Court has even adopted a more liberal view on this matter when in a latter case it held that a candidate who has tied with another and who submits himself to the drawing of lots, stating that if the result of said drawing of lots should be adverse to him, he would file a protest before a competent court, is not estopped from doing so. The view adopted by the Court in this latter case is in keeping with the doctrine that an election protest involves public interest, so that the court should allow all opportunity possible for the ascertainment of the true result of the elections. (De Castro vs. Ginete, G.R. No. L-30058, March 28, 1969)