Is the "three-flunk rule" which disallows students to take the NMAT for the fourth time unconstitutional?

The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved. A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients.

In Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. 

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits. (DECS vs. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989)

Does a school have the power to investigate and to expel students for writing and publishing obscene articles in their school paper?

Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:

(1) Who may teach,

(2) What may be taught,

(3) How it shall be taught, and

(4) Who may be admitted to study.

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."

Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.

In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.

The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. (Miriam College Foundation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127930, November 15, 2000)

DECS regulations prescribe a maximum of 3 years probation period for teachers. Does the termination of the 3-year period result in the automatic permanent status for the teachers?

■ While DECS regulations prescribe a maximum of three years probation period for teachers, the termination of the three-year period does not result in the automatic permanent status for the teacher. It must be conditioned on a showing that the teacher’s services during the probationary period was satisfactory in accordance with the employer's standards. The prerogative of the school to provide standards for its teachers and to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy which give educational institutions the right to choose who should teach.

■  There is no question that private respondents were probationary teachers. Thus, they are covered by the policy instructions issued by the Department of Labor and Employment that the probationary employment of professional instructors and teachers shall be subject to the standards established by the Department of Education and Culture. Said standards are embodied in paragraph 75 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, as follows:

75. Full time teachers who have rendered three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory services shall be considered permanent.

In University of Sto. Tomas vs. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court in interpreting the foregoing rule, held that the legal requisites for a teacher to acquire permanent employment and security of tenure are as follows:

(1) The teacher is a full time teacher;

(2) The teacher must have rendered three (3) consecutive years of service; and

(3) Such service must have been satisfactory.

There is no question that private respondents have been employed for three (3) consecutive years as teachers at petitioners' college and on a full time basis. However, they do not automatically become permanent unless it is shown that their services during the probationary period were satisfactory.

The contention of respondents that upon termination of the three-year probationary period the teacher automatically becomes permanent is not quite correct. It must be conditioned on the compliance with the third requisite that the services of said teacher during the probationary period was satisfactory.

The employer is the one who is to set the standards and determine whether or not the services of an employee are satisfactory. It is the prerogative of an employer to determine whether or not the said standards have been complied with. In fact, it is the right of the employer to shorten the probationary period if he is impressed with the services of the employees.

This prerogative of a school to provide standards for its teachers and to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy which give educational institution the right to choose who should teach. 

At the start of their employment, private respondents were duly furnished the Faculty Manual expressly stating among others, the duties of teachers and the grounds for termination of employment or non-appointment to permanent status of a probationary employee.

In the case of respondent Villegas, it appears that there were complaints of students during his last year of service and that these complaints were duly investigated by the Acting Dean of the Nautical Department who came up with the report of the acts complained of. 

Thus, his performance was considered unsatisfactory and was not renewed by petitioner college after the third year. That he was made to teach in the summer of 1984 appears to be prompted by the fact that the summer sessions were still part of the third probationary period which started in July of the first semester of school year 1981-82.

Similarly, respondent Pagapong was found to be inefficient due to her absences.

The Court thus finds and so holds that private respondents were not illegally dismissed by petitioner. (Cagayan Capitol College vs. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 90010-11, September 14, 1990)

May a school claim academic freedom in dropping a student for failure to complete some remaining units in the CMT course?

Academic freedom has never been meant to be an unbridled license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every "person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The punishment of expulsion is disproportionate to his having had some deficiencies in his CMT course. The circumstances lend truth to the petitioner's claim that the private respondent has strongly been influenced by his active participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition fee increase. (Isabelo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103142, November 8, 1993)

May a university revoke an academic degree it has conferred to a graduate who obtained the same through fraud or deceit?

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student, because it is precisely the graduation of such a student that is in question. Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.

Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a students rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.

In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that private respondent committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The Board of Regents decision to withdraw private respondents doctorate was based on documents on record including her admission that she committed the offense. (U.P. Board of Regents v. William, G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999)

Does the Civil Service rules on AWOL prevail over a university's academic freedom to choose who may teach or who may continue to teach in its faculty?

We have held time and again that the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. Clearly, this freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. 

By opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting him despite his absence without leave, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, the CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have done so without trampling upon the latter's constitutionally enshrined academic freedom. Moreover, the CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law. In short, on its own, the CSC does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls. (University of the Philippines and Alfredo de Torres v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 132860, April 3, 2001)

The UP College of Medicine Faculty prescribed a cutoff score of 70% in the NMAT for admission to medicine. The Board of Regents reverted the cut-off score to 70%. May the UPCM faculty refused to admit students obtaining a rating between 70-90% on the ground of academic freedom?

The individual faculty member has the freedom to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. In contrast, the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. As a corporate body, the University has entrusted to its academic staff the de facto control of its function of admission and examination of students. Petitioners now claim to be in charge of that function with respect to fixing the admission requirements in the college. We disagree. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix admission requirements is vested in the University Council of the autonomous campus which is composed of the President of the University of the Philippines and of all instructors holding the rank of professor, associate professor or assistant professor (Section 9, Act 1870). Consequently, the UC alone has the right to protest against any unauthorized exercise of its power. Petitioners cannot impugn these BOR directives on the ground of academic freedom inasmuch as their rights as university teachers remain unaffected. As succinctly explained by the appellate court:

Under the UP Charter, the power to fix the requirements for admission to any college of the university is vested in the University Council (Sec. 9). The power to prescribe the courses of study is vested in the University Council subject to the approval of the Board of Regents (Sec. 9). The power to appoint the academic staff, fix their compensation, hours of service and other conditions is vested in the Board of Regents [Sec. 6(e)]. The power to allocate the income among the different categories of expenditures is vested in the Board of Regents [Sec. 6(a)].

Academic freedom may be asserted by the University Council or by the Board of Regents or both in so far (sic) as it relates to the functions vested in them by law which are essential to institutional academic freedom.

The academic freedom claimed by the faculty to have been violated by the Board of Regents when it issued the questioned order is related to the right of the University to fix admission requirements. This right and power to fix admission requirements is clearly vested by law in the University Council. The College Faculty was merely empowered by the Board of Regents under Article 324 of the University Code to initially determine the admission requirements, subject to the approval of the University Council and the President of the University.

The questioned order of the Board of Regents in upholding the admission requirement approved by the University Council in 1986 is supportive of right of the University Council to fix or approve admission requirements, against the UPCM faculty and Dean who changed the admission requirements approved by the University Council without following the prescribed rules and procedures of the University. 

One final note. While We recognize and affirm the BOR's power of governance in the instant petitions, We, however, can not give Our imprimatur to its claim of plenary power over admission requirements. Such claim has no basis in law. The UC has the final say in admission requirements provided the same conforms with law, rules and regulations of the university. In the event the power is abused or misused, it becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest governing body in the university, to step in and to correct the anomaly. (Reyes vs. CA, G.R. No. 94961, February 25, 1991)

Did the Ombudsman investigator committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the administrative complaint against a faculty member who gave passing grades to certain students without requiring them to attend classes?

We agree with respondents position on the primacy of academic freedom in regard to higher institutions of learning. Dr. Daleons teaching style, validated by the action of the USP Board of Regents, is bolstered by the constitutional guarantee on academic freedom. Academic freedom is two-tiered that of the academic institution and the teachers.

Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. The right of the school to confirm and validate the teaching method of Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., how it shall be taught.

Academic freedom also accords a faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his particular specialty. It is defined as a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalty because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution. As applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his students (graduate students at that), subject only to the rules and policies of the university. Considering that the Board of Regents, whose task is to lay down school rules and policies of the University of Southeastern Philippines, has validated his teaching style, we see no reason for petitioner to complain before us simply because he holds a contrary opinion on the matter. (Camacho v. Coresis, G.R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002)

May a school be compelled to confer a student graduation honors considering that said student had incurred a failing grade in an earlier course she took?

It is an accepted principle that schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. (University of San Carlos vs. CA, G.R. No. 79237, October 18, 1988)

Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination?

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court:

The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment. 

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, regarding academic freedom to wit:

... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.

Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed. (Lupangco vs. CA, G.R. No. 77372, April 29, 1988)