May the President designate an Associate Commissioner as an Acting Chairman in the absence of the regular Chairman?

No. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. 

The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make. (Brillantes vs. Yorac, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990)

Is the decision or resolution penned by a member of a Commission who at the time of promulgation has vacated office valid?

No. There is no decision until the draft is signed and promulgated. Hence, if a commissioner signs a decision but retires before the decision is promulgated, his vote does not count even if it was he who penned the decision.


● A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision. The resolution or decision of the Division must be signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated.

Commissioner Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his retirement from office, but when he vacated his office without the final decision or resolution having been promulgated, his vote was automatically invalidated. Before that resolution or decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no valid resolution or decision to speak of. (Ambil vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 143398, October 25, 2000)

● A decision becomes binding only after its promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled. (Dumayas vs Comelec, G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001)

May Congress assume power to review rules promulgated by a Constitutional Commission?

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.

By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act. This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation. Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. (Macalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003)

In case of conflict between a rule of procedure promulgated by a Constitutional Commission and a Rule of Court, which prevails?

In case of conflict between a rule of procedure promulgated by a Constitutional Commission and a Rule of Court, the rule of the Commission should prevail if the proceeding is before the Commission; but if the proceeding is before a court, the Rules of Court prevail. (Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107852, October 20, 1993)

May the "no report, no release" policy may be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy?

The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

The automatic release of approved annual appropriations to a constitutional commission vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. (Civil Service Commission vs. DBM, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005)

Is Congress prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year? How about the Judiciary?

With respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly provides:

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5 merely states:

Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year. (Civil Service Commission vs. DBM, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005)