Can the Supreme Court create a Special Division of the Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide the plunder case against former Pres. Estrada?

Under Sec. 5, par. [5], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights and procedure in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly, given the nature of the Plunder Case and cases related thereto, the prominence of the principal accused and the importance of the immediate resolution of the cases to the Filipino people and the Philippine Government, this Court, in the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases, with due regard to the procedural and substantive rights of the accused, deems it best to create a Special Division of the Sandiganbayan to be composed of members mentioned in the immediately preceeding paragraph. This Special Division shall hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder Case and all related cases filed or which may hereafter be filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and those accused with him, until they are resolved, decided and terminated.

The designation of temporary alternate members may be properly addressed later. Meanwhile, until otherwise revoked, the Acting Presiding Justice is authorized to designate from time to time, an alternate member to be drawn from the remaining members of the Sandiganbayan as the exigencies of the service may require. (In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division, A.M. No. 02-1-07-SC, January 21, 2002)

Can the Congress amend the Rules of Court?

But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999)

Does the Special Prosecutor have authority to conduct an investigation on charges against a member of the Supreme Court?

A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.

The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms:

There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies, a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections  and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants, all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar.

 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.

It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings. (In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988)

May the Ombudsman initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against a judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers?

■ The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers. (Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001)


■ Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns.

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.

By virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. (Judge Caoibes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 17, 2001)

■ We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4

The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. (Maceda vs Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993)

Are the members of the Judiciary exempt from income taxes?

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably. (Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 284)

May the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases be appealed to the Supreme Court?

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. (Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742.  September 16, 1998)

In Fabian, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman. (Villavert vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715. February 23, 2000)

Can the Supreme Court review questions of fact over decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan?

It is well settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of facts exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

The Supreme court is not a trier of facts. It is not the Court’s function to examine and weigh all over again the evidence presented in the proceedings below.

A judge promulgated her decision within 3 months of the submission of the case for decision. However, only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation and it took a year and 8 months more before the complete decision was furnished the complaint. Did the judge violate any constitutional provision?

The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution which provides:

All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower courts.

Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of the submission of the case for decision, the fact is that only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of her decision, containing her findings and discussion of complainants liability, had already been prepared although it had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight months more before this was done and a copy of the complete decision furnished the complainant on December 16, 1994. Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

1. Judgment defined. - The term judgment as used in this Rule means the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the accused.

2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based. Since this was done only on December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision was served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision within three months as required by Art. VIII, 15 of the Constitution.

If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to see why it took respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was able to do so. Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out her decision by a series of personal and other problems which leads the Court to believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had not finished the preparation of the entire decision. At all events, she could have applied for extension of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of judgment until she had finished it.

What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a sin perjuicio judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment. That is why, in answer to complainants charge that the dispositive portion of the judgment read to him did not impose a fine, respondent contends that the addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within her power to do even if no such fine had been included in the oral sentence given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge states, because the decision was not complete it could be modified and cites in support of her contention the case of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia. Respondent only succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated on April 22, 1993 was a sin perjuicio judgment which was incomplete and needed a statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment was based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of rendering sin perjuicio judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed because of the implied reservation that it is subject to modification when the decision is finally rendered. This Court has expressed approval of the practice of some judges of withholding the dispositive portion from their opinions until the very last moment of promulgation of their judgment in order to prevent leakage, but that refers to the preparation of their decision, not its promulgation. What must be promulgated must be the complete decision. There would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of promulgation of judgment. (Dizon v. Judge Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338, September 5, 1997)